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THE IMPACT ON SECURITIZATION OF REVISED UCC 
ARTICLE 9 
STEVEN L. SCHW ARCZ* 
The recent revisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code ("UCC") are expected to have a significant impact on securiti-
zation-a type of financing that is perhaps the most rapidly growing 
segment of the U.S. credit markets and increasingly a major part of 
foreign credit markets. In its current form, Article 9 governs the sale 
of only certain types of assets that are involved in securitization 
transactions. Revised Article 9 attempts to broaden its coverage to 
virtually all securitized assets. I analyze how it does that and what it 
means for Article 9 to apply to these transactions, addressing issues of 
perfection and priority of asset transfers, commingling of proceeds, 
assignability of assets in the face of contractual restrictions, and the 
effect of negative pledge covenants. Finally, I show that the revisions 
of Article 9 do much to bring the commercial law setting for 
securitization into the twenty-first century. 
INTRODUCTION 
Asset securitization is "by far the most rapidly growing segment 
of the U.S. credit markets"! and increasingly is becoming a major part 
of foreign credit markets.2 In a typical securitization, a company 
(usually referred to as the "originator"3) sells rights in income-
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Faculty Director, Duke Global 
Capital Markets Center; and Special Counsel to Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler. E-
mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. Copyright © 1999 by Steven L. Schwarcz. The author thanks 
Bruce Bernstein, Carl Bjerre, Jason Kravitt, Eric Marcus, Sandra Rocks, and Ed Smith for 
helpful comments on a draft of this article. 
1. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death 0/ Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1,24 (1996). 
2. See generally Symposium, International Issues in Cross-Border Securitization and 
Structured Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 229 (1998) (bringing together leading scholars 
and practitioners from the private and public sectors to examine these issues). These articles 
also are available on-line at http://www.law.duke.eduijournals/djciU. For a discussion of the 
fundamental legal principles of cross-border securitization and finance, see Steven L. Schwarcz, 
The Universal Language a/Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 235 (1998). 
3. References in this article to originator, company, or debtor (the generic term favored 
by Article 9) will generally mean the originator in a securitization transaction. 
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producing or financial assets4 -such as accounts, instruments, lease 
rentals, franchise and license fees, and other intangible rights to 
payment-to a special purpose vehicle ("SPV"). The SPY, in turn, 
issues securities to capital market investors and uses the proceeds of 
the issuance to pay for the assets.S The investors, who are repaid from 
collections of the assets, buy the securities based on their assessment 
of the value of the assets. Because the Spy (and no longer the 
originator) owns the assets, their investment decision often can be 
made without concern for the originator's financial condition. Thus, 
viable companies that otherwise cannot obtain financing because of a 
weakened financial condition now can do so. Even companies that 
otherwise could obtain financing now will be able to obtain lower-cost 
capital market financing.6 
What does Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code have to 
do with securitization? In its current form, Article 9, which generally 
addresses only secured transactions, nonetheless governs the sale of 
certain types of financial assets - accounts and chattel paper - that are 
commonly involved in securitization transactions.7 The rationale for 
including sales of these assets in Article 9 was that "[c]ommercial 
financing on the basis of accounts and chattel paper is often so 
conducted that the distinction between a security transfer and a sale is 
blurred, and a sale of such property is therefore covered ... whether 
intended for security or not."8 This same rationale, and the significant 
4. The reader should not confuse my use of the securitization term "financial assets" with 
the unrelated term "financial asset" used in UCC Article 8 (and defmed in UCC section 
8-102(a)(9)). 
5. For authorities on securitization generally, see TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: 
STRUcruRED FiNANCING, FiNANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURmES (1991 
& Supp. 1999); STEVEN L. SCHW ARCZ, STRUcruRED FiNANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES 
OF ASSET SECURmZATION (2d ed. 1993); THE SECURmZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason 
H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and 
Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TuLANE L. REv. 101 (1997); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A 
Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. u. L.Q. 1061 (1996); and Steven L. Schwarcz, The 
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STANFORD J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994). 
6. Securitization has an increasingly international focus in part because companies that 
wish to raise funds from the capital markets may not be located in countries with established 
capital markets or because developing capital markets lack the depth of developed markets in 
other countries. In order to access capital market funding, those companies will have to 
structure deals that cross their national borders. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 236-37. 
7. Current UCC section 9-102(1)(b) provides that Article 9 applies "to any sale of 
accounts or chattel paper." (Subsequent references in this article to a current section of UCC 
Article 9 will simply refer to that "Current" section, and subsequent references in this article to 
a revised section of UCC Article 9 will simply refer to that "Revised" section.) The implicit 
assumption is that a given transfer either is intended for security and is, therefore, a secured 
transaction or else is a sale, and that Article 9 will govern both such transfers. 
8. u.e.e. § 9-102 cmt. 2. 
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minimization of transaction costs that the rule achieves,9 holds equally 
true today. 
What has changed today, however, is that, increasingly, many 
other types of financial assets are sold as part of commercial financing 
transactions. Whereas factoringlO was the only significant form of 
commercial financing to involve sales of financial assets (accounts and 
chattel paper) when the vee originally was adopted,1l securitiza-
tion-which involves the sale of a whole range of financial assets-
has now become significant. Yet, Article 9 had not been amended to 
take securitization into account. Revised Article 9 is a bold and 
largely successful attempt to remedy that omission and to adapt the 
law governing secured transactions to the realities of modern 
commercial and financial transactions. It accomplishes these goals in 
several ways. 
I. REVISED ARTICLE 9 BRINGS THE SALE OF MOST TYPES OF 
FINANCIAL ASSETS WITHIN ITS SCOPE 
As a threshold matter, Revised Article 9 brings within its scope 
the sale not only of accounts and chattel paper, as under current law, 
but also of "payment intangibles" and "promissory notes."12 
Significantly for securitization, the definition of an account is 
expanded from current law to include not only credit card 
receivables13 and health-care-insurance receivables14 but also any 
9. Transaction costs are minimized for several reasons. Parties do not have to make the 
difficult determination of whether each transfer is a secured transaction or a sale. Also, filing for 
both types of transfers will forestall litigation attempting to second-guess that determination if 
the debtor eventually goes bankrupt. Finally, pre-VCC sales of accounts had to be perfected 
under the common law procedures of the state where the seller was located. See SCHWARCZ, 
supra note 5, at 38-39. Different states had different rules and some required the account 
debtors to be notified of the sale. See id. Notification of numerous account debtors always 
would be costly and often would be impractical, creating uncertainty in the latter case as to the 
buyer's ownership rights in the accounts and sometimes discouraging the sale altogether. See id. 
at 39. Inclusion of sales of accounts and chattel paper in Article 9 circumvents those common 
law requirements. 
10. For an introduction to factoring, see PETER H. WElL, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A 
PRACfICAL GUIDE TO SECURED FINANCING § 2.3 (3d ed. 1998). For a discussion of the 
relationship between factoring and securitization, see Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 144-46. 
11. See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8.7, at 275, 
§ 10.5, at 308 (1965) (explaining that the inclusion of sales in Article 9 was necessary to protect 
"arrangements of the factoring type"). 
12. See Revised section 9-109(a)(3), the successor provision to Current VCC section 
9-102(1 )(b ) (defining scope). 
13. See R. § 9-102(a)(2)(vii) (including within the definition of an "account" rights to 
payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card). 
14. Revised section 9-102(a)(2) provides that "[t]he term [account] includes health-care-
insurance receivables," a term itself defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(46) to mean "an 
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"right to payment ... for property that has been or is to be ... 
licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of,"15 thereby covering 
license and franchise fee receivables. Moreover, the term payment 
intangible is broadly defined as "a general intangible under which the 
account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation."16 This 
definition appears intended to cover financial assets that are not 
already covered by the terms account, chattel paper, and promissory 
notes. For example, loan participations and commercial loans not 
evidenced by instruments17 would be payment intangibles. 
Accordingly, Revised Article 9 will apply to securitization 
transactions so long as the financial assets being sold consist of 
accounts (including credit card, health-care-insurance, license, and 
franchise fee receivables), chattel paper, promissory notes, or 
payment intangibles. I will refer to these types of financial assets as 
"covered financial assets." The reader should note, however, that in 
some securitization transactions, financial assets are not sold but are 
merely transferred as security.18 Revised Article 9 then will apply, as 
does Current Article 9, to virtually any financial asset so transferred.19 
The remainder of this article discusses what it means for Article 
9 to apply to the securitization of financial assets. Most significantly, 
all sales of covered financial assets will be perfected, and the priority 
of the SPY as against creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy of the 
originator will be governed, by the rules of Article 9. Establishing 
clear and pragmatic rules for perfection and priority of the transfer of 
covered financial assets will minimize transaction costs for the 
reasons previously explained in the context of transferring accounts 
interest in or claim under a policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a monetary 
obligation for health-care goods or services provided." In that connection, Article 9's traditional 
insurance exclusion no longer will exclude "an assignment by ... a health-care provider of a 
health-care-insurance receivable." Id. § 9-109(d)(8). 
15. Id. § 9-102(a)(2)(i). 
16. Id. § 9-102(a)(61). The term general intangible is defined in Revised section 
9-102( a)( 42). 
17. These being financial assets that are often transferred in collateralized loan obligation 
transactions. 
18. See Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 135, 140 n.26 (observing that whereas originators often 
structure the transfer of financial assets as a "true sale" in order to achieve bankruptcy 
remoteness, the transfer of financial assets from an investment grade originator to the SPV need 
not be structured as a sale). 
19. See R. § 9-109(a)(I) (providing that Revised Article 9 applies to any "transaction, 
regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by 
contract"). Subsections (c) and (d) of section 9-109 contain certain exclusions from Revised 
Article 9, few of which relate to securitization transactions. And even though Revised Article 9 
does not apply to security interests in (non-fixture) real property, it does apply to security 
interests in obligations secured by real property, such as mortgage loans. See id. § 9-109(b). 
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and chattel paper: parties to the securitization transaction will not 
have to make the difficult determination of whether each transfer of a 
covered financial asset is a secured transaction or a sale; filing for 
both types of transfers will forestall litigation attempting to second-
guess that determination if the originator in the securitization 
transaction eventually goes bankrupt; and sales of covered financial 
assets no longer will have to be perfected under state common law 
procedures that often are costly and impractical,2O 
But Revised Article 9 will apply to securitization in a myriad of 
other ways. In this article, I focus on the more significant impacts 
most likely to be encountered in a typical securitization transaction, 
such as mitigating the effect of commingling proceeds of financial 
assets and promoting assignability of financial assets, notwithstanding 
contractual restrictions to the contrary. The reader must recognize, 
however, that Revised Article 9 will have other impacts on securitiza-
tion, some less significant,21 some that will be significant in only 
certain transactions,22 and some whose significance might not become 
obvious until transactions are actually done under the revised 
statute.23 
Of course, the fact that Revised Article 9 will apply to the sale of 
covered financial assets does not mean that Article 9 applies to those 
sales for all purposes. In interpreting Oklahoma's enactment of 
Current Article 9, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals previously had 
concluded that Article 9's application to the sale of accounts-
characterizing the buyer of accounts as a "secured party," the seller as 
a "debtor," and the sold accounts as "collateral"-means that 
accounts cannot be sold under Oklahoma law.24 Although that 
20. Cf supra note 9 (explaining why the inclusion in Article 9 of accounts and chattel paper 
reduces the transaction costs of transferring those assets). 
21. For example, Revised section 9-209(c) sensibly provides that certain duties of a secured 
party that arise when a secured obligation is repaid do not apply to sales of covered financial 
assets, and Revised section 9·323(c) sensibly provides that certain priority rules regarding future 
advances also do not apply to such sales. 
22. Such as the ability to take a security interest in a deposit account under Revised section 
9-304 or the rules for bank setoff against such deposit account under Revised section 9-340. 
23. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking 
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 918 & n.23 (1995) (discussing that a Revised 
Article 9 can raise new problems of interpretation). 
24. See Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948, 955 (10th Cir. 1993). Octagon Gas 
Systems, which had sold the accounts, went bankrupt, and federal bankruptcy law looks to state 
law to determine whether an asset has been sold. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 
(1979) (holding that property rights are determined by state law and the involvement of an 
interested party in a bankruptcy proceeding has no effect on these rights). 
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decision was much criticized,25 and the Permanent Editorial Board of 
the VCC issued a commentary stating that the case was incorrect26 
and also amended comment 2 to Current section 9-102 to clarify 
interpretation,27 those actions have not generally been approved by 
legislatures or courts and do not necessarily have the force of law.28 
Revised Article 9, once approved by legislatures, is intended to drive 
the final nail into the Octagon coffin by providing not only that the 
question "whether a debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or 
involuntarily transferred is governed by law other than this article 
[9],"29 but also that a "debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, 
payment intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or 
equitable interest in the collateral sold."30 The latter point attempts to 
address the "rarified" argument that Octagon was correctly decided 
because certain limited property interests may remain with the 
originator after the sale of financial assets.3! 
25. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and 
Chattel Paper Under the u.c.c. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 
CONN. L. REv. 397 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz, "Octagon Gas" Ruling Creates Turmoil for 
Commercial and Asset-Based Finance, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1993, at 1. 
26. See PEB COMMENTARY NO. 14, TRANSFER OF ACCOUNTS OR CHArrEL PAPER (1994) 
(referring to the Octagon decision as "erroneous" and noting that "[t]o the extent the [Octagon] 
court relied on Article 9 in reaching its determination, this Commentary adopts a contrary 
position"). 
27. PEB Commentary No. 14 amended comment 2 to Current section 9-102 to read in part 
as follows: 
Neither Section 9-102 nor any other provision of Article 9 is intended to prevent 
the transfer of ownership of accounts or chattel paper. The determination of whether a 
particular transfer of accounts or chattel paper constitutes a sale or a transfer for 
security purposes (such as in connection with a loan) is not governed by Article 9 .... 
The use of terminology such as ... "collateral" to include accounts or chattel paper 
that have been sold is intended solely as a drafting technique ... and is not relevant to 
the sale or secured transaction determination. 
28. Only three states have addressed Octagon head-on by amending Current Article 9. 
Oklahoma and Utah added a new subsection (4) to section 9-102, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, 
§ 9-102 (Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-102 (1997), and Texas added new language to 
section 9-102(a)(2), see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999), in 
each case clarifying that the application of Article 9 to sales of accounts and chattel paper does 
not affect sale characterization. Even before those amendments, however, the practical effect of 
Octagon may have been limited to transactions undertaken by originators located in the Tenth 
Circuit. See Plank, supra note 25, at 459 n.278 (observing that rating agencies ignore the 
Octagon case when the originator is outside the Tenth Circuit). 
29. R. § 9-401. For an analysis of that other applicable law, see SCHWARCZ, supra note 5, at 
28-35. 
30. R. § 9-318(a). 
31. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1055, 1059-61 (1998) (characterizing this argument as rarified). Revised sections 9-207(d) 
and 9-601(g) address the same point by providing that the secured party as a buyer of accounts, 
chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes generally owes no duty to the debtor 
regarding the collateral. There is, however, a potential ambiguity in the language of Revised 
section 9-318(a). By stating that "a debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment 
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II. REVISED ARTICLE 9 ESTABLISHES CLEAR AND PRAGMATIC 
RULES FOR PERFECTION AND PRIORITY 
953 
Two of the essential goals of a commercial law statute are 
clarity32 and simplicity of implementation.33 In the context of the 
commercial law rules for perfection and priority, Revised Article 9 
furthers both of these goals. 
A. Perfection 
Perfection refers to the protection of a transferee's interest in 
transferred assets from creditors of the transferor and from the 
transferor's trustee in bankruptcy.34 Under Current Article 9, 
perfection is generally achieved by filing financing statements in 
jurisdictions where the debtor (originator) or the collateral is 
located.35 The problem, however, is that it is often unclear where the 
debtor and the collateral are located and, in the latter case, the 
location may well change. 
Revised Article 9 addresses this problem in two ways: by making 
the location of the debtor-as opposed to the location of the 
collateral-determine the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection 
in most cases;J6 and by clarifying where a debtor is deemed to be 
10catedY The former point is less critical to securitization, which 
involves intangibles, than to other forms of secured financing where 
intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold," 
it invites a court to find that when the debtor is in fact shown to have retained a legal or 
equitable interest, there is no sale under state law. Perhaps Revised section 9-318 or its 
comments should be amended to clarify that is not the intention. 
32. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 928 ("A statute ... governing commercial law ... 
should be clear.' Clarity is important to minimize mistakes, ambiguities, and resulting disputes 
and litigation. Clarity also helps to preserve expectations, which is essential to market 
transactions."); see also Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dentsply Profl Plan, 617 P.2d 1340, 
1343 (Okla. 1980) ("Although strict adherence to [Uniform Commercial Code) requirements 
may at times lead to harsh results, efforts by courts to fashion equitable solutions for mitigation 
of hardships experienced by creditors in the literal application of statutory filing requirements 
may have the undesirable effect of reducing the degree of reliance the market place should be 
able to place on the Code provisions. The inevitable harm doubtless would be more serious to 
commerce than the occasional harshness from strict obedience."). 
33. See Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 939 ("Simplicity of implementation ... has two aspects. 
First, it should be simple to understand how to apply commercial law. In this sense, simplicity is 
related to the principle of clarity, which maintains that the law should be straightforward, 
unambiguous, and clear. Second, the implementation of commercial law should be practical and 
cost-effective." (footnote omitted)). 
34. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 240 & n.19 (defining perfection). 
35. See U.e.e. §§ 9-103, 9-302, 9-40l. 
36. See R. §§ 9-301(1), 9-305(c). 
37. See id. § 9-307. 
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the assets are tangible items that can be moved around. But the latter 
point is quite significant to securitization. Section 9-307 of Revised 
Article 9 changes the rule of Current section 9-103(3) to provide that 
registered organizations, such as corporations, organized under the 
law of a particular state are deemed to be located in that state.38 Thus, 
one would file financing statements against an originator 
incorporated under the laws of Delaware in Delaware, irrespective of 
where the originator's assets or business are located.39 Furthermore, 
where the originator is a foreign company not incorporated under 
state law, Revised Article 9 provides that its location is in the foreign 
jurisdiction where the originator has its chief executive office (or, if 
the originator has only one place of business, in the jurisdiction where 
that place is located), but only if that jurisdiction itself has a public 
filing system for perfection.40 If that jurisdiction does not have a 
public filing system, the originator is deemed to be located in the 
District of Columbia.41 Of course, whether filing in the District of 
Columbia will achieve perfection under the law of the foreign 
jurisdiction is also a question of that jurisdiction's law.42 
Revised Article 9 also brings a measure of pragmatism to the se-
curitization of payment obligations evidenced by instruments. Under 
current law, a security interest in instruments can only be perfected 
by taking possession of the instrument.43 That may be impractical, 
however, where (as is common) a securitization transaction involves 
the transfer of large pools of instruments. The revision solves that 
38. See id. § 9-307(e). This does not completely eliminate the problem that the filing 
location would change if the debtor reincorporates in another state, but that rarely happens. 
39. Cf Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 968 & n.215 (arguing that "[i]n this age where personal 
computers and telefaxes permit executives to work at home, bricks and mortar no longer are the 
sole determinants of a company's location" and that "it sometimes may be costly to verify the 
location of a small business or to monitor whether the business remains in that location"; and 
therefore recommending an easier filing location, such as "the state of the debtor's 
organization"). See also Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should Be 
the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REv. 577, 638-45 (1995) 
(arguing that a state of incorporation rule should not significantly alter the distribution of filing 
revenues among states). 
40. See R. § 9-307(b)-(c). 
41. See id. § 9-307(c). For a discussion of the merits and rationale of this rule, see Carl S. 
Bjerre, International Project Finance Transactions: Selected Issues Under Revised Article 9, 73 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 261, 271-75 (1999). 
42. Compare the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
("UNCITRAL") proposed Convention on Assignment in Receivables Financing, 28 U.N. 
Comm'n on Int'l Trade L. Y.B. (1998) (discussed in Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 240 & n.21, and 
in Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL's 
Contribution, 8 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 315, 320 (1998», which provides that the law of the 
assignor's location governs perfection of cross-border receivables financings. 
43. See U.e.e. §§ 9-304(1), 9-305. 
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problem by allowing a security interest in instruments to be perfected 
by filing.44 Nonetheless, holders in due course and certain other 
purchasers for value of instruments would have priority on the 
rationale that requiring them to check the filing system in connection 
with each purchase would impede those transactions, whereas there is 
only "a remote possibility that is not of serious concern" that an 
originator will voluntarily transfer instruments to third parties in 
breach of contractual restrictions.45 
One of the major controversies that arose during the Article 9 
revision effort was how to perfect the sale of payment intangibles. 
Bankers were concerned that a perfection requirement of filing 
financing statements would subject them to costly new procedures 
when selling loan participations, a form of payment intangible.46 A 
somewhat practical solution was reached to mitigate this concern: the 
sale of payment intangibles would be deemed to be automatically 
perfected, without the need to file financing statementsY This 
solution, however, is imperfect. Buyers of payment intangibles cannot 
search filing records to determine whether those intangibles 
previously have been sold to others. Thus, an SPY in a securitization 
transaction cannot ascertain the priority (discussed below) of the 
SPY's ownership rights, other than by relying on representations of 
the originator. Originators that are insufficiently capitalized to back 
up their representations therefore may find it difficult to securitize 
payment intangibles. 
44. See R. § 9-312(a). 
45. See PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR 1HE UNIF. COMMERCIAL 
CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REpORT 155 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter PEB 
REpORT); Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 970-71 (arguing that filing should be a permitted way to 
perfect a security interest in instruments). Thus, Revised section 9-331 provides that a filed 
financing statement does not constitute notice that would preclude a purchaser from becoming a 
holder in due course, and Revised section 9-330(d) provides that purchasers for value who take 
possession of an instrument generally have priority over a security interest perfected by filing. 
46. Parties to the Article 9 revision process found it difficult to differentiate loan 
participations, which are typically undivided interests in loans, from other types of payment 
intangibles. In the debate over this issue, I argued: 
Few banks ... comply with [the pre-UeC) common law requirements [for sales of loan 
participations), which may involve obligor notification or "policing." ... If a bank does 
not comply, then its failure to file financing statements under Article 9, if it applied to 
sales of loan participations, would put it in no worse position than at present. Banks 
would take the insolvency risk of the selling bank, as they likely do now. 
Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 956 n.165 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the political heat of the 
controversy overwhelmed rational inquiry. For a history of this controversy and its solution, see 
Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief History, 73 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 167 (1999). 
47. See R. §§ 9-309(3), 9-310(b )(2). 
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B. Priority 
Priority refers to the ranking of mUltiple claims against a 
transferred asset48 In a securitization context, it means that "the SPVs 
and investors' claims against the transferred financial assets are 
superior [in ranking] to any third-party claims," including that of the 
originator's trustee in bankruptcy.49 Under Current Article 9, priority 
is generally accorded to the first secured creditor to file or perfect, 
under a rule usually referred to as "first in time, first in right"50 
Revised Article 9 continues that rule.51 
There is, however, one exception under Current Article 9 to first 
in time, first in right A holder of a purchase money security interest 
("PMSI") generally takes priority over an earlier perfected security 
interest in the same collatera1.52 That exception, however, would 
create a significant problem for securitization and other forms of 
accounts receivable financing: because accounts are the proceeds of 
inventory, it would mean that a later perfected inventory financier 
with a PMSI would take priority over an earlier perfected SPY or 
accounts financier. To ensure that the PMSI exception does not 
discourage accounts receivable financing, Current Article 9 has a 
special rule that favors accounts receivable financiers, including SPVs 
that purchase accounts, over purchase money financiers of 
inventory.53 Revised Article 9 continues that special rule.54 
III. REVISED ARTICLE 9 MITIGATES THE EFFECT OF COMMINGLING 
OF PROCEEDS 
Commingling refers to the mixing of proceeds of collateral with 
assets of the originator. Under Current Article 9, in an "insolvency 
48. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 24l. 
49. See id. 
50. See V.CC. § 9-312(5). 
51. See R. § 9-322(a)(1) (providing that "[c]onflicting perfected security interests ... rank 
according to priority in time of filing or perfection"). For an interesting critique of this rule, see 
ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTI, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 660, 664-65 (2d ed. 1991). 
52 See V.CC § 9-312(3)-(4). Current VCC section 9-107 defmes a PMSI as a security 
interest "taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price" or 
"taken by a person who by making advances ... gives value to enable the debtor to acquire 
rights in or the use of collateral." The former is sometimes referred to as a "seller PMSI" and 
the latter as a "lender PMSI." See Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 963. 
53. VCC section 9-312(3), which governs a PMSI in inventory, fails to give the PMSI 
priority over a conflicting security interest in accounts generated by such inventory. See also 
V.CC. § 9-312 cmt. 3. 
54. See R. § 9-324(b). 
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proceeding" (such as bankruptcy),55 the secured party or SPY's 
interest in cash proceeds will be lost if the cash is commingled with 
other funds of the originator, except to the extent that an artificial 
formula preserves the security interest.56 However, this rule is unfair 
to secured parties because it can arbitrarily limit the amount of a 
perfected security interest in commingled cash proceeds and it allows 
an originator contemplating bankruptcy, in what has become a 
commonplace legal strategy for debtors, to intentionally commingle 
proceeds of a perfected security interest in advance of filing a 
bankruptcy petition in order to use the formula to defeat the 
perfected interestY 
Revised Article 9 will remedy that unfairness. Rejecting the 
artificial formula, it returns to the common law principles of 
"tracing," under which a perfected security interest will continue in 
traceable cash proceeds of the original collatera1.58 This would permit 
common law tracing rules such as the "lowest intermediate balance 
rule," in which it is presumed that funds remaining in an account after 
withdrawal by the debtor include the proceeds of collateral (or, put 
another way, that withdrawals from a deposit account following the 
deposit of proceeds are first made from non-proceeds).59 
Revised Article 9 also expands the definition of proceeds, which 
currently includes only what "is received upon the sale, exchange, 
collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds."60 This 
relatively narrow definition had created confusion, for example, as to 
whether dividends of stock are proceeds.61 Under the expanded 
55. See U.cc § 1-201(22) (defining "insolvency proceedings"). 
56. UCC section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) sets forth that formula. 
57. See Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 957 (describing and commenting on that strategy). 
58. See R. § 9-315(a)(2), (b)(2) (permitting the secured party to identify the proceeds "by a 
method of tracing, including application of equitable principles, that is permitted under law 
other than this article [9]"). 
59. For a more complete explanation of these tracing rules, see Universal C.I. T. Credit 
Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325-27 (E.D. Mo. 1973); and BARKLEY CLARK, THE 
LAW OF SECURED TRANSACfIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'll 10.03 (rev. 
ed. 1993 & Supp. III 1999). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 (1959) (similar rule 
under trust law). The only problem, however, with rejection of the artificial formula of Current 
section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) is that "the tracing/LlBR approach may be more difficult and expensive 
to apply." PEB REpORT, supra note 45, at 124. For an approach that would combine the relative 
simplicity of the artificial formula with the fairness of a tracing approach, see Schwarcz, supra 
note 23, at 958. 
60. U.CC § 9-306(1) (defining "proceeds"). 
61. See, e.g., FDIC v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that stock dividends do not constitute proceeds because the payment of dividends does not 
constitute "an event whereby one asset is disposed of and another is acquired as its substitute," 
as contemplated by Current section 9-306(1)'s definition of proceeds). For a general analysis of 
this case, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Rights, Preventing Windfalls: A Model for 
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definition, stock dividends clearly would be included.62 
This expanded definition of proceeds can have major significance 
for securitization. Increasingly, the financial assets used in securitiza-
tion transactions represent rights to payment that arise in the future 
("future assets"). If, however, the originator goes bankrupt after the 
securitization transaction is entered into, section 552(a) of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code may cut off the SPY's interest in future assets.63 
While section 552(b)(1) generally would preserve the Spy's interest 
in future assets, that interest is only preserved to the extent that the 
future assets constitute "proceeds, product, offspring, or profit[]" of 
the SPY's pre petition assets.64 In this connection, courts interpret the 
term "proceeds" by reference to the VCC definition.65 Thus, Revised 
Article 9's expanded definition of proceeds will expand the universe 
of future assets that can be sold to SPVs without the fear of the SPVs' 
interest in those assets being cut off in the event of the originator'S 
bankruptcy.66 
IV. REVISED ARTICLE 9 PROMOTES ASSIGNABILITY 
NOTWITHSTANDING CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTION 
Parties to contracts sometimes restrict the assignment of rights 
and obligations thereunder.67 These restrictions are often referred to 
Harmonizing State and Federal Laws on Floating Liens, 75 N.C. L. REv. 403, 441-45 (1997). 
62 See R. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining proceeds to include not only "whatever is acquired 
upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral," but also (among other 
things) "whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral," and "rights arising 
out of collateral"). My example of stock dividends is illustrative; the reader should be aware 
that Current section 9-306(1) was amended in 1994 specifically to provide that "[a]ny payments 
or distributions made with respect to investment property collateral are proceeds." 
63. Section 552(a) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, 
property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the [bankruptcy] 
case [post-petition] is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into 
by the debtor before the commencement of the case [prepetition]." 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994). I 
have argued, however, that section 552 should not cut off a pre petition sale of the right to post-
petition payments, such as a prepetition sale of future assets. See Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 
456-58 (analyzing the tension between section 552 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code and uec 
section 9-204 (permitting "floating liens"». 
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
65. See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper Sales, 
Inc.), 907 F.2d 1430, 1437 (4th CiT. 1990) (holding that "the UCC's definition and treatment of 
proceeds applies to Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code"). 
66. The SPY's interest in those assets, in the event of the originator's bankruptcy, 
nonetheless might be subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy. See Schwarcz, supra note 61, 
at 458. If the relevant transfer of future assets is not a true sale, the SPV's interest also may be 
subject to the equitable powers of a bankruptcy judge. See id. at 458-61 (discussing judicial 
interpretation of the equities exception in 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1». 
67. For example, franchise agreements commonly restrict the right of either party to assign 
the agreement or any right therein. 
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as "anti-assignment clauses." In a securitization transaction, the 
parties to that contract are the originator and a third party obligated 
on the financial asset. Because the focus is on the originator's transfer 
of its rights in the financial asset to an SPY, we need only examine the 
obligor's ability to restrict that transfer. 
Current Article 9 nullifies anti-assignment clauses that prohibit 
"assignment of an account or ... creation of a security interest in a 
general intangible for money due or to become due."68 The rationale 
given is that the nullification of anti-assignment clauses "is widely 
recognized in the cases and ... corresponds to current business 
practices."69 An implicit rationale, however, might be that the obligor 
on the account or general intangible is not prejudiced by its 
assignment,70 whereas enforcing the anti-assignment clause would 
impair the free alienability of property rights.71 
Revised Article 9 clarifies the rule of Current Article 9. First, the 
revision eliminates any argument that a transfer of financial assets in 
violation of an invalidated anti-assignment clause nonetheless 
constitutes a breach as between the obligor and the origina!or.72 
Second, the revision treats anti-assignment clauses in payment 
intangibles and promissory notes differently depending on whether 
the transfer in question is a sale or merely a transfer for security. 
Anti-assignment clauses would be ineffective in both cases from 
preventing perfection of the transfer of the right to payment,73 but 
they would be upheld to prevent an originator from selling its 
underlying business relationship.74 Thus, if the originator is a bank 
which has made a loan to a borrower, the bank could sell a 
participation in that loan-a loan participation being a payment 
intangible75 -to an Spy or other third party and could perfect that 
sale notwithstanding an anti-assignment clause in the underlying loan 
68. V.C.c. § 9-318(4). 
69. Id. § 9-318 cmt. 4. But note that non-VCC law sometimes upholds anti-assignment 
clauses. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(c) (1981). 
70. Current section 9-318 protects the obligor from being prejudiced by the assignment. 
71. A financial asset represents the originator's right to payment, and property, after all, is 
merely a bundle of rights. 
72 See R. §§ 9-406(d)(2), 9-408(a)(2) (providing that a transfer in violation of an anti-
assignment clause does not constitute a default). 
73. See id. §§ 9-406(d), 9-408(a)-(b). 
74. Revised section 9-408(d) effectively provides that, in the case of sales of payment 
intangibles or promissory notes and in the case of any transfer of a health-care-insurance 
receivable, anti-assignment clauses are ineffective to thwart perfection of the sale or other 
transfer but may be effective for all other purposes. 
75. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
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agreement; but the bank could not alter the underlying debtor-
creditor relationship with its borrower. The buyer of the loan 
participation therefore would have no direct collection rights against 
the borrower. 
V. REVISED ARTICLE 9 CLARIFIES THE EFFECT OF A NEGATIVE 
PLEDGE COVENANT 
A negative pledge covenant is an agreement by a debtor in favor 
of a third party (typically, a creditor) in which the debtor agrees not 
to grant a security interest in or otherwise encumber its assets.76 In a 
securitization context, originators often make negative pledge 
covenants in favor of SPVs regarding transferred and to-be-
transferred financial assets. If, of course, those financial assets already 
have been sold to the SPY and the originator retains no interest 
therein, the originator would have no power to grant a security 
interest and a negative pledge covenant then would be superfluous. 
But it is sometimes unclear whether the financial assets have been 
sold; and originators often do retain interests, such as interests in 
financial assets not yet sold, or undivided interests in financial assets 
that have been sold, or rights to surplus collections. In those cases, 
negative pledge covenants may be important. 
Current Article 9 is unclear as to the enforceability of a negative 
pledge covenant.77 Revised Article 9 offers clarity by providing that 
while negative pledge covenants cannot restrict alienability, a transfer 
of financial assets in breach of a negative pledge covenant 
nonetheless constitutes a default by the originator.78 That default 
could entitle the SPY to exercise remedies against the originator and 
76. Sometimes, the debtor agrees not to grant a security interest in its assets without 
equally and ratably securing the creditor, in which case the negative pledge covenant is 
commonly referred to as an "equal and ratable clause." 
77. Current section 9-311 provides that "[t]he debtor's rights in collateral may be 
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred ... notwithstanding a provision in the security 
agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default." It is uncertain 
whether this means that negative pledge covenants are unenforceable or merely that negative 
pledge covenants cannot restrict the transfer but the transfer nonetheless constitutes a breach of 
the covenant. 
78. Revised section 9-401(b) provides that "[a]n agreement between the debtor and 
secured party which prohibits a transfer of the debtor's rights in collateral or makes the transfer 
a default does not prevent the transfer from taking effect." Comment 5 explains that if, in 
violation of a negative pledge covenant, the debtor "purports to grant a security interest in the 
same collateral to another secured party[,] [s]ubsection (b) validates [the] creation of the 
subsequent (prohibited) security interest. ... However, ... subsection (b) does not provide that 
the [negative pledge covenant] itself is 'ineffective.' Consequently, the debtor's breach may 
create a default." 
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might also allow the SPY to sue the transferee, if it knew or should 
have known of the breached covenant, for tortious interference with 
contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The revision of Article 9 does much to bring the commercial law 
setting for securitization into the twenty-first century by embracing a 
broader range of financial assets, setting clear and pragmatic rules for 
perfection and priority of their transfer, clarifying inadvertent legal 
ambiguities, and reducing unnecessary transaction costs. 

